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Beyond Tax Smoothing 
 
If taxes are non-distortionary, the result is Ricardian equivalence - there is no 
unique level of government debt that is optimal and the timing of tax burdens has no 
impact on social welfare.  If there are no transaction costs associated with securities 
transactions, then what is commonly called the “Miller Modigliani Theorem of Public 
Finance” holds as well - the optimal government capital structure is indeterminate.  
Papers that articulate these results include Barro (1974), Wallace (1981), Chan (1983), 
and Stiglitz (1983).  
Should, however, taxation engender deadweight losses, the timing of taxation will 
generally matter.  Barro (1979) shows that in a deterministic setting, if the marginal 
welfare loss associated with taxation is an increasing function of tax rates, then the 
optimal fiscal strategy is to hold tax rates constant over time – something known as “tax 
smoothing” or the “inter-temporal Ramsey Rule.”  Papers such as Lucas and Stokey 
(1983) and Aiyagari et.al. (2002) show that Barro’s result holds even in a stochastic 
setting, with the caveat being that governments no longer stabilize tax rates but rather 
expected tax rates, which then evolve in a random walk as unexpected events alter 
economic conditions and spending requirements. A textbook exposition of these ideas is 
offered in Romer (2000).1
Following this logic, Bohn (1990) and Barro (1995) demonstrate that in a 
stochastic setting, the optimal government capital structure is also no longer 
 
                                                 
1 Anderson and Dogonowski (2004) show that stabilization of expected tax rates will generally not be 
optimal when output, rather than government consumption, is stochastic.  
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indeterminate – social welfare can be enhanced if governments establish a capital 
structure whose risk/return characteristics eliminate or at least minimize the need to alter 
tax rates over time and states of nature.  Over the years, an extensive literature has 
developed surrounding the issue of tax smoothing and optimal government capital 
structure, including papers such as Kingston (1991), Zhu (1992), Chari, Christiano, and 
Kehoe (1994), Barro (1999), Missale (1997), Judd (1999), Angeletos (2002), Buera and 
Nicolini (2004), Fisher and Kingston (2004), Nosbusch (2008), Angyridis (2009), Marcet 
and Scott (2009) and Niemann and Pichler (forthcoming). These studies either follow 
Bohn (1990) in assuming the public to be risk neutral or Barro (1995) in assuming that 
the risk premium is exogenous.   
 In this paper we consider the government’s choice of capital structure when the 
risk premium is modeled as an endogenous variable. We find that the optimal 
government capital structure strategy no longer stabilizes tax rates.   Introduction of an 
endogenous risk premium alters the government’s decision problem in two ways.  First, it 
gives the government an interest in manipulating the risk premium in order to enhance 
the profitability of its chosen capital market position.  Depending on whether the 
government is long or short risky assets, this may encourage the government to choose a 
capital structure consistent with either a lower or higher risk premium than that of a tax 
smoothing strategy.  Second, introduction of an endogenous risk premium allows the 
government to attach greater weight to the minimization of deadweight losses associated 
with “bad” states of nature and less weight towards the reduction of deadweight losses 
associated with “good” states of nature.  All else equal, this encourages the government 
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to choose a capital structure with a lower risk premium than that consistent with a tax 
smoothing strategy. 
This paper is divided into four sections.  In Section Two, we sketch out a simple 
two period model of the government’s capital structure problem.  In our model, the public 
is risk averse and makes expected utility maximizing portfolio decisions, taking the 
amount of government debt as exogenous.  Symmetrically, the government chooses its 
asset position to maximize the public’s expected utility, but treats the risk premium as 
exogenous.  The resulting policy rule replicates the results of other analyses of the 
government’s capital structure problem - the best policy is to choose a capital structure 
that stabilizes taxation to the greatest extent possible. In Section Three, we re-evaluate 
the government’s capital structure problem, but drop the assumption that the government 
is a price taker as far as the risk premium is concerned.    The resultant policy rule no 
longer attempts to stabilize tax rates.  Section Four concludes the paper and evaluates the 
implications of our findings for government policy.   
 
II: The Model with an Exogenous Risk Premium 
 
 
Assume that there are many identical citizens whose objective is to maximize 
their expected utility, EU(C), where C is consumption and U’ is positive while U” is 
negative.  Each citizen, i, has an initial endowment of wealth, W, in the form of shares of 
a risky asset.  In period one, citizens allocate that wealth to portfolios made up of risk 
free government bonds, B, and risky assets, A.  Hence, for citizen i, W = Bi + Ai.  Let A 
and B equal the average values of Ai and Bi. A need not equal Ai since individual 
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citizens, in addition to being able to trade risky assets and bonds with the government, are 
also able to trade risky assets and bonds with each other. We assume that the values of B 
and A are not constrained to be positive, although W must be positive.  Hence, both the 
government as well as private citizens are able to take long or short positions in risk free 
bonds or in risky assets.   
During the second period, citizens receive labor income, L. Their net wage is (1-
t)L – D(tL), where t is the rate of taxation and D(tL) is the deadweight welfare loss 
associated with this taxation.   Following Barro (1979), we assume that D’ and D” are 
positive.  In addition to wage income, citizens also earn interest, r, on their bond 
portfolio, and they earn a stochastic return, R, on their risky asset portfolio.  To keep the 
analysis as simple as possible, we assume that no taxes are levied on r or R.   
Following receipt of net wages and realization of the returns on their investments, 
citizens consume all of their income and wealth, hence 
 
(1) Ci = (1-t)L – D(tL) + (1+r)Bi + (1+R)Ai.  
  
The taxes raised from labor income are used to finance government spending.  Let 
G represent government spending per capita.  The government holds a portfolio of risky 
assets worth W-A per capita.  As a result, the government’s per capita bond position 
equals A–W.  The government may choose to issue bonds and allocate the resultant funds 
to the purchase of a portfolio of risky assets (W-A > 0), or alternatively, the government 
could sell short risky assets and buy risk free bonds issued by the private citizens (W-A < 
0).  




(2) G = tL + R (W-A) - r(W-A),  
 
which can be solved for t: 
 
(3) t = [G – (W-A)(R-r)]/L.  
 
The tax rate, t, is stochastic because R and G are stochastic.  Using (2) and (3) and 
substituting W-Ai for Bi, we can now express (1) as 
 
(4) Ci = L – G+W (1+R) + (R-r)(Ai-A) – LD[G/L – (W-A)(R-r)/L].  
 
We assume that the government’s objective is to maximize the welfare of citizens.  
Hence, the government will choose the level of risky assets to hold (and risk free bonds 
to issue) that maximizes EU(C).  Citizens seek to maximize EU(Ci) and choose the mix 
of risky and risk free assets that will do so. 
In addition to the first order conditions for these maximizations, the equilibrium 
conditions for the economy are provided by the symmetry of the citizens (which assures 
that A = Ai) and by conservation of assets (total holdings of assets are W and total 
holdings of bonds are 0).  For now, we will also assume that the government as well as 
private citizens act as price takers. 
In order to identify the values of A and Ai that maximize EU(C), we expand 
EU(C) around the means of R and G, which are its only stochastic elements 
 




where VRR and ıGG are the variances of R and G, while VRG is the covariance between R 
and G.  The terms in this approximation are given by: 
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In order to write the first order conditions, the derivatives evaluated at the mean 
values of G and R are also needed.  These are given by: 
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By solving for ER – r in both equations, setting them equal to each other, and 
noting that A = Ai, we find that: 
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The expression in (12) is the familiar minimum variance hedge, and implies that 
the government maximizes social welfare by adopting a capital structure that minimizes 
the variance in tax rates required to finance government spending.  In other words, a 
welfare maximizing government should engage in tax smoothing – the stabilization of tax 
rates over different future states of nature - through the use of financial instruments.  This 
result is identical to those offered in Bohn (1990) and Barro (1995).  
Now, let us continue the analysis.  To solve for the equilibrium risk premium, we 
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If the government seeks to smooth taxation, the equilibrium risk premium is 
larger than if it did nothing when the covariance of R and G is positive.  Similarly, the 
equilibrium risk premium will be lower if the covariance of R and G is negative. If the 
later is the case, then government efforts to stabilize tax rates involve the shorting of 
risky assets. 
It is interesting that the equilibrium risk premium declines (rises) when private 
citizens increase (reduce) their aggregate holdings of risky assets.  The reason for this is 
that the increase (decrease) in citizens’ direct exposure to portfolio risk is more than 
offset by the opposite change in the indirect exposure to portfolio risk that citizens face as 
taxpayers responsible for the financing of government activities. 
 
III.  The Model with an Endogenous Risk Premium 
 
Now, let us relax the assumption that the government is a price taker.  Instead, 
consider the situation when the government explicitly takes into account the effect of its 
choice of capital structure on the equilibrium risk premium.  This means that instead of 
finding the value of A that maximizes EU(C), the government must now identify the 
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There are three terms on the right hand side of the expression.  The first term is 
simply (11), while the second term reflects the fact that Ai is no longer exogenous but is 
now itself determined by the government since dAi/dA = 1. The second term is equal to 
zero because it is the private asset pricing constraint given by (10).   
In order to evaluate the third term, we derive the tradeoff between A and r that 
faces the government.  To find the slope of the change in r with respect to a change in A, 
we impose A = Ai, and take the derivatives of (10): 
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Using these expressions, we find that 
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This expression is positive as long as W-A is negative - when the government 
takes a short position in risky assets.  As a result, (15) will only equal zero if its first term 
is positive.  This requires A to be larger than required to maximize (11).  In other words, 
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when the government takes a short position and treats the risk premium as endogenous, 
citizens will hold more risky assets than when the government is treating the risk 
premium as exogenous.  Since the policy rule with an exogenous risk premium is to 
stabilize tax rates, the government’s capital structure will be “shorter” than that implied 
by tax smoothing. 
A more complicated situation arises when W-A is positive and the government 
has taken a long position in risky assets.  In that case, the sign of dr/dA is ambiguous.  If 
W-A is sufficiently large, dr/dA will be positive.  As a result, the value of A required for 
(15) to equal zero will be smaller than that required to stabilize tax rates and the 
government’s capital structure will be “longer” than that implied by tax smoothing.  For 
sufficiently small values of W-A, however, dr/dA will be negative.  In that case, the value 
of A required is larger and the government’s capital market position is “less long” than 
that implied by tax smoothing. 
These results illustrate the interplay of two separate effects.  The first stems from 
the government’s desire to enhance the profitability of its capital market position. By 
increasing the profitability of its investments, the government can lower taxation, and 
hence lower the deadweight losses associated with that taxation.   
If the government is planning to sell short risky assets, it can increase its profits 
by lowering the risk premium.  This raises the valuation of the risky assets that the 
government is selling.  If, on the other hand, the government is planning to purchase risky 
assets, profits are increased by raising the risk premium.  This lowers the valuation of the 
assets that the government is buying.  Since the risk premium declines when the 
government takes a short position in risky assets and rises when the government takes a 
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long position in risky assets, this effect leads a government that is short selling to take a 
larger short position than it otherwise would, while it leads a government that is taking a 
long position in risky assets to take a larger long position than it otherwise would. 
The second effect relates to the impact of deadweight losses over different future 
states of nature.  As a result of risk aversion, the deadweight losses stemming from 
taxation will cause more damage to social welfare should future realized states of nature 
turn out to be “bad.”  As a result, the optimal government capital structure attaches 
greater weight to the minimization of deadweight losses associated with bad states of 
nature and less weight towards the reduction of deadweight losses associated with good 
states of nature.  This leads the government to always take a position that is “shorter” 
than that consistent with the stabilization of tax rates, and the government’s capital 
structure leads to tax reductions in the event of bad states of nature while requiring tax 
hikes in the event of good states of nature.   
When the government is taking a short position, both of the effects lead it to 
choose a short position even larger than that implied by tax stabilization.  Hence, dr/dA is 
unambiguously negative when W-A is negative.  When the government is taking a long 
position, however, the desire to maximize profits leads to a longer capital market 
position, while the desire to minimize deadweight losses in bad states of nature lead to a 
shorter position.  Overall, the result is that the sign of dr/dA is ambiguous and depends 
critically on the value of W-A.  If W-A is sufficiently large, the importance of increasing 
the profitability of the government capital market position outweighs the importance of 
minimizing deadweight losses in bad states of nature – hence, dr/dA is positive.  If the 
government’s choice of W-A is small, however, profits on its capital market position will 
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play a relatively small role in determining the optimal capital structure, and dr/dA is 
negative.  
 
IV.   Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we demonstrated that in an economy with an endogenous risk 
premium, a government seeking to enhance social welfare will not choose a capital 
structure that stabilizes tax rates over time and states of nature.  Rather, the government 
will take a larger short position than that implied by tax smoothing when the return on 
risky assets is negatively correlated with fluctuations in government spending.  When the 
correlation between risky asset returns and spending is positive, however, the socially 
optimal capital structure may require a greater or smaller long position in risky assets 
when compared to the position consistent with tax smoothing.     
 Papers such as Bohn (1990), Buera and Nicolini (2004), Missale (1997), and 
Faraglia et. al. (2006), estimate the capital structure required to stabilize tax rates and 
generally find that tax smoothing requires short positions in risky assets.  This makes 
sense, given that events likely to cause positive shocks in government spending include 
cyclical downturns, natural disasters, and wars.  Given our analysis, tax stabilizing 
government capital structures will not be “short enough” to maximize expected social 
welfare.  In other words, a government seeking to maximize social welfare should go 
“beyond tax smoothing” – hence the title of this paper. 
In practice, does this matter?  As long as governments are limited to the use of 
traditional instruments such as nominal debt of various maturities, the answer is probably 
not.  Government capital structures required to achieve tax stabilization involve short 
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positions in nominal debt several hundred times the size of GDP.  Since a position that 
large is clearly not feasible, any suggestion that the optimal short position is even larger 
than that seems to be of no consequence.  
 There are, however, some policies that may help a government achieve the capital 
structure consistent with social welfare optimization. One possibility is to aggressively 
privatize state owned firms.2
  
 A second alternative is to issue GDP linked debt.  Papers 
such as Borensztein et. al. (2004) and Kamstra and Shiller (2009) have argued that 
issuance of reasonable quantities of such securities could greatly expedite efforts to 
achieve “short” government capital structures.   
                                                 
2 See Berck et. al. (2006) for an analysis of the role that state owned firms play in contributing to a 
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Abstract:   Analyses of optimal government capital structure generally follow Bohn (1990) and 
Barro (1995) in assuming risk neutrality or an exogenous risk premium.  These analyses usually 
conclude that the optimal government capital structure stabilizes tax rates over time and states of 
nature to the greatest extent possible, something known as “tax smoothing.”  In this paper, we 
show that when an endogenous risk premium is introduced, the optimal government capital 
structure will no longer smooth tax rates. Under likely conditions, the optimal structure requires 
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